Abstract. We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search.
We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism is not truthful, but has a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to our mechanism. As far as we can tell, this is the first treatment of sponsored search that directly incorporates both multiple slots and budget constraints into an analysis of incentives.
Our mechanism employs a descending-price auction that maintains a solution to a certain machine scheduling problem whose job lengths depend on the price, and hence is variable over the auction. The price stops when the set of bidders that can afford that price pack exactly into a block of ad slots, at which point the mechanism allocates that block and continues on the remaining slots. To prove our result on the equilibrium of the revenue-maximizing mechanism, we first show that a greedy algorithm suffices to solve the revenue-maximizing linear program; we then use this insight to prove that bidders allocated in the same block of our mechanism have no incentive to deviate from bidding the fixed price of that block.
Introduction
Sponsored search is an increasingly important advertising medium, attracting a wide variety of advertisers, large and small. When a user sends a query to a search engine, the advertisements are placed into slots, usually arranged linearly down the page. These slots have a varying degree of exposure, often measured in terms of the probability that the ad will be clicked; a common model is that the higher ads tend to attract more clicks. The problem of allocating these slots to bidders has been addressed in various ways. The most common method is to allocate ads to each search independently via a generalized second price (GSP) auction, where the ads are ranked by (some function of) their bid, and placed into the slots in rank order. (See [18] for a survey of this area.)
There are several important aspects of sponsored search not captured by the original models. Most advertisers are interested in getting many clicks throughout the day on a variety of searches, not just a specific slot on a particular search query. Also, many advertisers have budget constraints, where they do not allow the search engine to spend more than their budget during the day. Finally, search engines may have some knowledge about the distribution of queries that will occur during the day, and so should be able to make more efficient allocation decisions than just simple ranking.
The Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem is this: given a set of bidders with bids (per click) and budgets (per day), and a set of slots over the entire day where we know the expected number of clicks in each slot, find a schedule that places bidders into slots. The schedule must not place a bidder into two different slots at the same time. In addition, we must find a price for each bidder that does not exceed the bidder's budget constraint, nor their per-click bid. (See Section 1.3 for a formal statement of the problem.)
A good algorithm for this problem will have high revenue. Also, we would like the algorithm to be truthful; i.e., each bidder will be incented to report her true bid and budget. In order to prove something like this, we need a utility function for the bidder that captures the degree to which she is happy with her allocation. Natural models in this context (with clicks, bids and budgets) are click-maximization-where she wishes to maximize her number of clicks subject to her personal bid and budget constraints, or profit-maximization-where she wishes to maximize her profit (clicks × profit per click). In this paper we focus on click-maximization. 3 We present an efficient mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling and prove that it is truthful. We also prove that the revenue-optimal mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling is not truthful, but has a Nash equilibrium (under the same utility model) whose outcome is equivalent to our mechanism; this result is strong evidence that our mechanism has desirable revenue properties. Our results generalize to a model where each bidder has a personal click-through-rate that multiplies her click probability.
As far as we can tell, this is the first treatment of sponsored search that directly incorporates both multiple positions and budget constraints into an analysis of incentives (see Section 1.2 for a survey of related work). In its full generality, the problem of sponsored search is more complex than our model; e.g., since the query distribution is noisy, good allocation strategies need to be online and adaptive. Also, our mechanism is designed for a single query type, whereas advertisers are interested in enforcing their budget across multiple query types. However, the tools used in this paper may be valuable for deriving more general mechanisms in the future.
Methods and Results.
A natural mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling is the following: find a feasible schedule and a set of prices that maximizes revenue, subject to the bidders' constraints. It is straightforward to derive a linear program for this optimization problem, but unfortunately this is not a truthful mechanism (see Example 1 in Section 2). However, there is a direct truthful mechanism-the price-setting mechanism we present in this paperthat results in the same outcome as an equilibrium of the revenue-maximizing mechanism.
We derive this mechanism (and prove that it is truthful) by starting with the single-slot case in Section 2, where two extreme cases have natural, instructive interpretations. With only bids (and unlimited budgets), a winner-take-all mechanism works; with only budgets (and unlimited bids) the clicks are simply divided up in proportion to budgets. Combining these ideas in the right way results in a natural descending-price mechanism, where the price (per click) stops at the point where the bidders who can afford that price have enough budget to purchase all of the clicks.
Generalizing to multiple slots requires understanding the structure of feasible schedules, even in the special budgets-only case. In Section 3 we solve the budgets-only case by characterizing the allowable schedules in terms of the solution to a classical machine scheduling problem (to be precise, the problem Q | pmtn | C max [13] ). The difficulty that arises is that the lengths of the jobs in the scheduling problem actually depend on the price charged. Thus, we incorporate the scheduling algorithm into a descending-price mechanism, where the price stops at the point where the scheduling constraints are tight; at this point a block of slots is allocated at a fixed uniform price (dividing the clicks equally by budget) and the mechanism iterates. We present the full mechanism in Section 4 by incorporating bids analogously to the single-slot case: the price descends until the set of bidders that can afford that price has enough budget to make the scheduling constraints tight. A tricky case arises when a new bidder appears whose budget violates the scheduling constraints; in this case the budget of this "threshold" bidder is reduced to make them tight again. Finally in Section 4.2 we show that the revenue-optimal mechanism has a Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to our mechanism. This follows from the fact that if all the bidders in a block declare a bid (roughly) equal to the price of the block, nobody has an incentive to deviate, since every bidder is charged exactly her bid, and the clicks are divided up equally by budget.
Related
Work. There are some papers on sponsored search that analyze the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, which is the auction currently in use at Google and Yahoo. The equilibria of this auction are characterized and compared with VCG [9, 17, 2, 22] . Here the utility function is the profit-maximizing utility where each bidder attempts to maximize her clicks × profit per click, and budget constraints are generally not treated.
Borgs et al. [4] consider the problem of budget-constrained bidders for multiple items of a single type, with a utility function that is profit-maximizing, modulo being under the budget (being over the budget gives an unbounded negative utility). They give a truthful mechanism allocating some portion of the items that is revenue-optimal, and prove that in their model, under reasonable assumptions, truthful mechanisms that allocate all the units are impossible. Our work is different both because of the different utility function and the generalization to multiple slots with a scheduling constraint. Using related methods, Mahdian et al. [19] consider an online setting where an unknown number of copies of an item arrive online, and give a truthful mechanism with a constant competitive ratio guarantee.
There is some work on algorithms for allocating bidders with budgets to keywords that arrive online, where the bidders place (possibly different) bids on particular keywords [20, 19] . The application of this work is similar to ours, but their concern is purely online optimization; they do not consider the gametheoretic aspects of the allocation. Abrams et al. [1] derive a linear program for the offline optimization problem of allocating bidders to queries, and handle multiple positions by using variables for "slates" of bidders. Their LP is related to ours, but again they do not consider game-theoretic aspects of their proposed allocations.
Bidder strategies for keyword auctions in the presence of budget constraints have also been considered [11, 21, 6, 5] . Generally these papers are not concerned with mechanism design, but there could be some interesting relationships between the models in these papers and the one we study here.
In our setting one is tempted to apply a Fisher Market model: here m divisible goods are available to n buyers with money B i , and u ij (x) denotes i's utility of receiving x amount of good j. It is known [3, 10, 7] that under certain conditions a vector of prices for goods exists such that the market clears, in that there is no surplus of goods, and all the money is spent. Furthermore, this price vector can be found efficiently [8] . The natural way to apply a Fisher model to a slot auction is to regard the slots as commodities and have the utilities be in proportion to the number of clicks. However this becomes problematic because there does not seem to be a way to encode the scheduling constraints in the Fisher model; this constraint could make an apparently "market-clearing" equilibrium infeasible, and indeed plays a central role in our investigations.
1.3 Our Setting. We define the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem as follows. We have n > 1 bidders interested in clicks. Each bidder i has a budget B i and a maximum cost-per-click (max-cpc) m i . Given a number of clicks c i , and a price per click p, the utility u i of bidder i is c i if both the true max-cpc and the true budget are satisfied, and −∞ otherwise. In other words, u i = c i if p ≤ m i and c i p ≤ B i ; and u i = −∞ otherwise. We have n ′ advertising slots where slot i receives D i clicks during the time interval [0, 1]. We assume
In a schedule, each bidder is assigned to a set of (slot, time interval) pairs (j, [α, β)), where j ≤ n ′ and 0 ≤ α < β ≤ 1. A feasible schedule is one where no more than one bidder is assigned to a slot at any given time, and no bidder is assigned to more than one slot at any given time. (Formally, the intervals for a particular slot do not overlap, and the intervals for a particular bidder do not overlap.) A feasible schedule can be applied as follows: when a user query comes at some time α ∈ [0, 1], the schedule for that time instant is used to populate the ad slots. If we assume that clicks come at a constant rate throughout the interval [0, 1], the number of clicks a bidder is expected to receive from a schedule is the sum of (β − α)D j over all pairs (j, [α, β)) in its schedule.
4
A mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling takes as input a declared budget B i and declared max-cpc (the "bid") b i , and returns a feasible schedule, as well as a price per click p i ≤ b i for each bidder. The schedule gives some number c i of clicks to each bidder i that must respect the budget at the given price; i.e., we have p i c i ≤ B i .
The revenue of a mechanism is i p i c i . We say a mechanism is truthful if it is a weakly dominant strategy to declare one's true budget and max-cpc; i.e., for any particular bidder i, given any set of bids and budgets declared by the other bidders, declaring her true budget B i and max-cpc m i maximizes her utility u i . A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium is a set of declared bids and budgets such that no bidder wants to change her declaration of bid or budget, given that all other declarations stay fixed. An ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a set of bids and budgets where no bidder can increase her utility by more than ǫ by changing her bid or budget.
Throughout the paper we assume some arbitrary lexicographic ordering on the bidders, that does not necessarily match the subscripts. When we compare two bids b i and b i ′ we say that
One Slot Case
In this section we consider the case k = 1, where there is only one advertising slot, with some number D := D 1 of clicks. We will derive a truthful mechanism for this case by first considering the two extreme cases of infinite bids and infinite budgets. The proofs of the theorems in this section are in Appendix A.
Suppose all budgets B i = ∞. Then, our input amounts to bids b 1 ≻ b 2 ≻ . . . ≻ b n . Our mechanism is simply to give all the clicks to the highest bidder. We charge bidder 1 her full price p 1 = b 1 . We claim that reporting the truth is a weakly dominant strategy for this mechanism. Clearly all bidders will report b i ≤ m i , since the price is set to b i if they win. The losing bidders cannot gain from decreasing b i . The winning bidder can lower her price by lowering b i , but this will not gain her any more clicks, since she is already getting all D of them. Now suppose all bids b i = ∞. In this case, our input is just a set of budgets B 1 , . . . , B n , and we need to allocate D clicks, with no ceiling on the per-click price. Here we apply a simple rule related to pricing schemes for network bandwidth (see [16, 15] 
Greedy First-Price Mechanism.
A natural mechanism for the general single-slot case is to solve the associated "fractional knapsack" problem, and charge bidders their bid; i.e., starting with the highest bidder, greedily add bidders to the allocation, charging them their bid, until all the clicks are allocated. We refer to this as the greedy first-price (GFP) mechanism. Though natural (and revenue-maximizing as a function of bids) this mechanism is easily seen to be not truthful: Example 1. Suppose there are two bidders and D = 120 clicks. Bidder 1 has (m1 = $2, B1 = $100) and bidder 2 has (m2 = $1, B2 = $50). In the GFP mechanism, if both bidders tell the truth, then bidder 1 gets 50 clicks for $2 each, and 50 of the remaining 70 clicks go to bidder 2 for $1 each. However, if bidder 1 instead declares b1 = $1 + ǫ, then she gets (roughly) 100 clicks, and bidder 2 is left with (roughly) 20 clicks.
The problem here is that the high bidders can get away with bidding lower, thus getting a lower price. The difference between this and the unlimited-budget case above is that a lower price now results in more clicks. It turns out that in equilibrium, this mechanism will result in an allocation where a prefix of the top bidders are allocated, but their prices equalize to (roughly) the lowest bid in the prefix (as in the example above).
The Price-Setting
Mechanism. An equilibrium allocation of GFP can be computed directly via the following mechanism, which we refer to as the price-setting (PS) mechanism. Essentially this is a descending price mechanism: the price stops descending when the bidders willing to pay at that price have enough budget to purchase all the clicks. We have to be careful at the moment a bidder is added to the pool of the willing bidders; if this new bidder has a large enough budget, then suddenly the willing bidders have more than enough budget to pay for all of the clicks. To compensate, the mechanism decreases this "threshold" bidder's effective budget until the clicks are paid for exactly. We formalize the mechanism as follows:
Price-Setting (PS) Mechanism (Single Slot)
• Let k be the first bidder such that Note that this mechanism reduces to the given mechanisms in the special cases of infinite bids or budgets (with the proper treatment of infinite bids/budgets).
Theorem 1. The price-setting mechanism (single slot) is truthful.

Price-Setting Mechanism Computes Nash Equilibrium of GFP.
Consider the greedy first-price auction in which the highest bidder receives B 1 /b 1 clicks, the second B 2 /b 2 clicks and so on, until the supply of D clicks is exhausted. It is immediate that truthfully reporting budgets is a dominant strategy in this mechanism, since when a bidder is considered, her reported budget is exhausted as much as possible, at a fixed price. However, reporting b i = m i is not a dominant strategy. Nevertheless, it turns out that GFP has an equilibrium whose outcome is (roughly) the same as the PS mechanism. One cannot show that there is a plain Nash equilibrium because of the way ties are resolved lexicographically; the following example illustrates why. clicks, (m1 = $2, B1 = $100) and (m2 = $1, B2 = $50). But now suppose that bidder 2 occurs first lexicographically. In GFP, if bidder 2 tells the truth, and bidder 1 declares b1 = $1, then bidder 2 will get chosen first (since she is first lexicographically), and take 50 clicks. Bidder 2 will end up with the remaining 70 clicks. However, if bidder 1 instead declares b1 = $1 + ǫ for some ǫ > 0, then she gets 100/(1 + ǫ) clicks. But this is not a best response, since she could bid 1 + ǫ/2 and get slightly more clicks.
Thus, we prove instead that the bidders reach an ǫ-Nash equilibrium: Theorem 2. Suppose the PS mechanism is run on the truthful input, resulting in price p and clicks c 1 , . . . , c n for each bidder. Then, for any ǫ > 0 there is a pure-strategy ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the GFP mechanism where each bidder receives c i ± ǫ clicks.
Multiple Slots: Bids or Budgets Only
Generalizing to multiple slots makes the scheduling constraint nontrivial. Now instead of splitting a pool of D clicks arbitrarily, we need to assign clicks that correspond to a feasible schedule of bidders to slots. The conditions under which this is possible add a complexity that we characterize and incorporate into our mechanism in this section.
As in the single-slot case it will be instructive to consider first the cases of infinite bids or budgets. Suppose all B i = ∞. In this case, the input consists of bids only
Naturally, what we do here is rank by bid, and allocate the slots to the bidders in that order. Since each budget is infinite, we can always set the prices p i equal to the bids b i . By the same logic as in the single-slot case, this is easily seen to be truthful. In the other case, when b i = ∞, there is a lot more work to do, and we devote the remainder of the section to this case.
Without loss of generality, we may assume the number of slots equals the number of bids (i.e., n ′ = n); if this is not the case, then we add dummy bidders with B i = b i = 0, or dummy slots with D i = 0, as appropriate. We keep this assumption for the remainder of the paper. The proofs of the theorems in this section are in Appendix B.
3.1 Assigning slots using a classical scheduling algorithm. First we give an important lemma that characterizes the conditions under which a set of bidders can be allocated to a set of slots, which turns out to be just a restatement of a classical result [14] from scheduling theory. 
Proof. In scheduling theory, we say a job with service requirement x is a task that needs x/s units of time to complete on a machine with speed s. The question of whether there is a feasible allocation is equivalent to the following scheduling problem: Given k jobs with service requirements x i = c i , and k machines with speeds s i = D i , is there a schedule of jobs to machines (with preemption allowed) that completes in one unit of time? As shown in [14] , the optimal schedule for this problem (a.k.a. Q|pmtn|C max ) can be found efficiently by the level algorithm, 5 and the schedule completes in
Thus, the conditions of the lemma are exactly the conditions under which the schedule completes in one unit of time.
⊓ ⊔ 3.2 A multiple-slot budgets-only mechanism. Our mechanism will roughly be a descending-price mechanism where we decrease the price until a prefix of budgets fits tightly into a prefix of positions at that price, whereupon we allocate that prefix, and continue to decrease the price for the remaining bidders.
The following subroutine, which will be used in our mechanism (and later in the general mechanism), takes a set of budgets and determines a prefix of positions that can be packed tightly with the largest budgets at a uniform price p. The routine ensures that all the clicks in those positions are sold at price p, and all the allocated bidders spend their budget exactly.
Routine "Find-Price-Block" Input: Set of n bidders, set of n slots with
• If all D i = 0, assign bidders to slots arbitrarily and exit.
• Sort the bidders by budget and assume wlog that
• Let ℓ * be the largest ℓ such that r ℓ = p. Allocate slots {1, . . . ℓ * } to bidders {1, . . . , ℓ * } at price p, using all of their budgets; i.e., c i :
Note that in the last step the allocation is always possible since for all ℓ ≤ ℓ * , we
, and so we can apply Lemma 1. Now we are ready to give the mechanism in terms of this subroutine; an example run is shown in Figure 1 .
Price-Setting Mechanism (Multiple Slots, Budgets Only)
• Run "Find-Price-Block" on bidders 1, . . . , n, and slots 1, . . . , n. This gives an allocation of ℓ * bidders to the first ℓ * slots.
• Repeat on the remaining bidders and slots until all slots are allocated.
Let p 1 , p 2 , . . . be the prices used for each successive block assigned by the algorithm. We claim that p 1 > p 2 > . . .; to see this, note then when p 1 is set, we have p 1 = r k and p 1 > r ℓ for all ℓ > k, where k is the last bidder in the block. Thus for all ℓ > k, we have p 1 j≤ℓ D j > i≤ℓ B j , which gives p 1 k<j≤ℓ D j > k<i≤ℓ B j using p 1 = r k . This implies that when we apply Find-Price-Block the second time, we get r ′ ℓ = k<i≤ℓ B j / k<j≤ℓ D j < p 1 , and so p 2 < p 1 . This argument applies to successive blocks to give p 1 > p 2 > . . ..
Theorem 3. The price-setting mechanism (multiple slots, budgets only) is truthful.
Main Results
In this section we give our main results, presenting our price-setting mechanism in the general case, building on the ideas in the previous two sections. We begin in schedule, and show that it can be computed with a generalization of the greedy first-price (GFP) mechanism. We then show that GFP has an ǫ-Nash equilibrium whose outcome is identical to the general PS mechanism. The proofs of the theorems in this section are in Appendix C.
The Price-Setting Mechanism (General Case).
The generalization of the PS mechanism combines the ideas from the bids-and-budgets version of the single slot mechanism with the budgets-only version of the multiple-slot mechanism. As our price descends, we maintain a set of "active" bidders with bids at or above this price, as in the single-slot mechanism. These active bidders are kept ranked by budget, and when the price reaches the point where a prefix of bidders fits into a prefix of slots (as in the budgets-only mechanism) we allocate them and repeat. As in the single-slot case, we heave to be careful when a bidder enters the active set and suddenly causes an over-fit; in this case we again reduce the budget of this "threshold" bidder until it fits. We formalize this as follows:
(ii) Let k be the first bidder such that running Find-Price-Block on bidders 1, . . . , k would result in a price p ≥ b k+1 .
(iii) Reduce B k until running Find-Price-Block on bidders 1, . . . , k would result in a price p ≤ b k . Apply this allocation, which for some ℓ * ≤ k gives the first ℓ * slots to the ℓ * bidders among 1 . . . k with the largest budgets.
(iv) Repeat on the remaining bidders and slots.
An example run of this mechanism is shown in Figure 2 . Since the PS mechanism sets prices per slot, it is natural to ask if these prices constitute some sort of "market-clearing" equilibrium in the spirit of a Fisher market. The quick answer is no: since the price per click increases for higher slots, and each bidder values clicks at each slot equally, then bidders will always prefer the bottom slot. Note that by the same logic as the budgets-only mechanism, the prices p 1 , p 2 , . . . for each price block strictly decrease. Figure 1 , but now add bids as shown. Running Find-Price-Block on only bidder 1 gives a price of r1 = 80/100, which is less than the next bid of $1. So, we run Find-Price-Block on bidders 1 and 3 (the nexthighest bid), giving r1 = 80/100 and r2 = 100/150. We still get a price of $0.80, but now this is more than the next-highest bid of $0.75, so we allocate the first bidder to the first slot at a price of $0.80. We are left with bidders 2-4 and slots 2-4. With just bidder 3 (the highest bidder) and slot 2, we get a price p = 20/50 which is less than the next-highest bid of $0.75, so we consider bidders 2 and 3 on slots 2 and 3. This gives a price of max{70/50, 90/75} = $1.40, which is more than $0.50. Since this is also more than $0.75, we must lower B2 until the price is exactly $0.75, which makes B Efficiency. So far we have been largely ignoring the efficiency of computing the allocation in the PS mechanism. It is immediately clear that the general PS mechanism can be executed in time polynomial in n and log(1/ǫ) to some precision ǫ using binary search and linear programming.
In fact, a purely combinatorial O(n 2 ) time algorithm is possible. As bidders get added in step (ii), maintaining a sorted list of bidders and budgets can be done in time O(n log n). Thus it remains to show that running Find-Price-Block (and computing the reduced budget) can be done in O(n) time given these sorted lists. In Find-Price-Block, computing the ratios r ℓ can be done in linear time. Finding the allocation from Lemma 1 can also be done in linear time using the Gonzalez-Sahni algorithm [12] for scheduling related parallel machines (in fact the total time for scheduling can be made O(n) since each slot is scheduled only once). Finally, computing the reduced budget is a simple calculation on each relevant ratio r ℓ , also doable in linear time. We suspect that there is a O(n · polylog(n)) algorithm using a more elaborate data structure; we leave this open.
Theorem 4. The price-setting mechanism (general case) is truthful.
Greedy First-Price Mechanism for Multiple Slots.
In the general case, as in the single-slot case, there is a natural greedy first-price mechanism when the bidding language includes both bids and budgets: Order the bidders by bid b 1 ≻ b 2 ≻ . . . ≻ b n . Starting from the highest bidder, for each bidder i compute the maximum possible number of clicks c i that one could allocate to bidder i at price b i , given the budget constraint B i and the commitments to previous bidders c 1 , . . . , c i−1 . This reduces to the "fractional knapsack" problem in the single-slot case, and so one would hope that it maximizes revenue for the given bids and budgets, as in the single-slot case. This is not immediately clear, but does turn out to be true, as we will prove in this section.
As in the single-slot case, the greedy mechanism is not a truthful mechanism. However, we show that it does have a pure-strategy equilibrium, and that equilibrium has prices and allocation equivalent to the price setting mechanism.
Greedy is Revenue-Maximizing. Consider a revenue-maximizing schedule that respects both bids and budgets. In this allocation, we can assume wlog that each bidder i is charged exactly b i per click, since otherwise the allocation can increase the price for bidder i, reduce c i and remain feasible. Thus, by Lemma 
Theorem 5. The greedy first-price auction gives a revenue-maximizing schedule.
Price-Setting Mechanism is a Nash Equilibrium of the Greedy First Price Mechanism. We note that truthfully reporting one's budget is a weakly dominant strategy in GFP, since when a bidder is considered for allocation, their budget is exhausted at a fixed price, subject to a cap on the number of clicks they can get. Reporting one's bid truthfully is not a dominant strategy, but we can still show that there is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium whose outcome is arbitrarily close to the PS mechanism. Theorem 6. Suppose the PS mechanism is run on the truthful input, resulting in clicks c 1 , . . . , c n for each bidder. Then, for any ǫ > 0 there is a pure-strategy ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the GFP mechanism where each bidder receives c i ±ǫ clicks.
Conclusions
In this paper we have given a truthful mechanism for assigning bidders to clickgenerating slots that respects budget and per-click price constraints. The mechanism also respects a scheduling constraint on the slots, using a classical result from scheduling theory to characterize (and compute) the possible allocations. We have also proved that the revenue-maximizing mechanism has an ǫ-Nash equilibrium whose outcome is arbitrarily close to our mechanism. This final result in some way suggests that our mechanism is the right one for this model. It would interesting to make this more formal; we conjecture that a general truthful mechanism cannot do better in terms of revenue.
Extensions.
There are several natural generalizations of the Online Ad Slot Scheduling problem where it would be interesting to extend our results or apply the knowledge gained in this paper. We mention a few here.
Click-through rates. In sponsored search (e.g. [9] ) it is common for each bidder to have a personal click-through-rate γ i ; in our model this would mean that a bidder i assigned to slot j for a time period of length α would receive αγ i D j clicks. All our results can be generalized to this setting by simply scaling the bids using b ′ i = b i γ i . However, our mechanism in this case does not necessarily prefer more efficient solutions; i.e., ones that generate more overall clicks. It would be interesting to analyze a possible tradeoff between efficiency and revenue in this setting.
Multiple Keywords. To model multiple keywords in our model, we could say that each query q had its own set of click totals D q,1 . . . D q,n , and each bidder is interested in a subset of queries. The greedy first-price mechanism is easily generalized to this case: maximally allocate clicks to bidders in order of their bid b i (at price b i ) while respecting the budgets, the query preferences, and the click commitments to previous bidders. It would not be surprising if there was an equilibrium of this extension of the greedy mechanism that could be computed directly with a generalization of the PS mechanism.
Online queries, uncertain supply. In sponsored search, allocations must be made online in response to user queries, and some of the previous literature has focused on this aspect of the problem (e.g., [20, 19] ). Perhaps the ideas in this paper could be used to help make online allocation decisions using (unreliable) estimates of the supply, a setting considered in [19] , with game-theoretic considerations.
A Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Theorem 1: For the purposes of this proof, let bidders {1, . . . , n} be such that b 1 ≻ . . . ≻ b n = 0, and consider a new bidder (call her Alice) with true max-cpc m and true budget B * . We first show that reporting the true budget is a weakly dominant strategy for Alice, for any fixed bid b > 0. Let ℓ be the first bidder with b ≻ b ℓ , so
If B ≥ bD then the mechanism will not allocate any clicks to Alice, regardless of the reported budget, since the price will stop before reaching b. If B < bD, we will argue that Alice's clicks c are non-increasing in B. DefineB = bD − B > 0.
-If Alice declares B ∈ [B, ∞], then the price will stop at b. She will spendB and receive c =B/b clicks. -If Alice declares B ∈ [0,B), then the price will be lower than b, and she will spend all of her budget. Her final number of clicks will be c = (B/(B + B + R))D, where R is the total spend of bidders {ℓ, . . . , n}. Since R is non-increasing in B, we can conclude that c is non-decreasing in B.
Putting together these intervals, we see that c is non-decreasing in B overall, and since Alice's total spend is min{B,B}, we may conclude that it is weakly dominant to declare B = B * .
It remains to show that it is weakly dominant for Alice to declare a bid b = m, given that she declares a budget B = B * . Let R(b) be the total spend of bidders {1, . . . , n} given that Alice declares b. Note that R(b) is non-increasing in b. Let p 1 be the price that would result if b = ∞, and let p 2 be the price that would result if b = 0. Note that p 2 ≤ p 1 .
-If b ∈ [0, p 2 ) then the price stops at p 2 and Alice receives zero clicks. 
clicks, and we may conclude that in this interval, clicks are non-decreasing with b.
Note that in the expression (2), plugging in p 1 for b yields c = B/p 1 . Thus we have that in the interval [p 2 , ∞], clicks are non-decreasing with b, and the price is always min{b, p 1 }. We conclude that bidding b = m is a weakly dominant strategy. ⊓ ⊔
Proof of Theorem 2:
We will show that for sufficiently small ǫ ′ > 0, if each bidder truthfully reports her budget and bids b i = min{m i , p + ǫ ′ } in the GFP mechanism, then the conditions in the theorem hold.
There are two ways that the PS mechanism (under truthful input) can reach its last allocated bidder k and final price p: if m k > p ≥ m k+1 and then pD = We will prove that the number of clicks Alice receives is non-increasing as she lowers her declared budget B, which immediately implies that truthful reporting of budgets is weakly dominant in the PS mechanism. Let r B j be the ratio r j assuming Alice bids B; so r
let k B be the last slot in the first price block chosen by the mechanism. So, k B = arg max k r B k (if there are multiple maxima, then k B is the largest lexicographically).
For sufficiently large B > B 1 , we get that r B 1 > r B k for all k and so k B = 1. For any such B Alice receives D 1 clicks, the most possible. Now as we lower B, two significant events could occur; we could drop to another bidder's budget B i , or we could have a change in k B , thus changing the set of bidders in the first block. If neither of these events occur, then Alice remains in the first price block, but gets a smaller share of the clicks. Thus it remains to cover these two events.
If B = B i for some i, then note that by Lemma 2, Alice cannot be the last bidder in the block, so i is in the same block as Alice. Therefore we may exchange the roles of Alice and bidder i lexicographically (i.e., increase Alice's rank by one) and nothing changes. Now suppose B reaches a point where r k changes because arg max k r B k changes from k B to k ′ . We use k * = k B for the remainder of the proof for ease of notation. At the bid B we have r n (by the same reasoning about "rate" as above). Since r B k * = r B k ′ we have that the price of Alice's block and the first block will be the same. Since Alice is spending her entire budget before and after the change in r k at the same price, her clicks remain the same. As we continue to decrease B beyond this point, we simply remove the bidders and slots from the first price block, and imagine that we are again in the first price block of a reduced instance.
⊓ ⊔ 
C Proofs for Section 4
The number of clicks a bidder is allocated is non-decreasing in her declared budget.
Proof sketch: Let bidders {1, . . . , n} be such that b 1 ≻ . . . ≻ b n , and consider a new bidder Alice with bid b ℓ−1 ≻ b ≻ b ℓ . We will argue that the number of clicks that Alice receives is non-increasing as she reduces her declared budget B. Suppose Alice declares B = ∞ and letB be the amount she would spend (Alice would always be a threshold bidder if she declared B = ∞). Any declared budget B ∈ [B, ∞] would result in the same number of clicks, because B is reduced by the mechanism in step (iii) toB. Now as B decreases fromB, two different events could occur: (a) Alice's price block threshold ℓ * could change (because Find-Price-Block outputs a different ℓ * ) or (b) the lowest bidder k could change (because running Find-Price-Block on 1, . . . , k gave a price less than b k+1 ). For event (a), and between these events, the arguments from Theorem 3 imply that Alice's clicks are non-increasing.
For event (b), when the price of the Alice's block is exactly b k+1 , if bidder k + 1 is added, the resulting price output by Find-Price-Block in step (ii) is still at least b k+1 , since adding a bidder cannot reduce the price. Also Lemmas 3 and 2 together imply that Alice is still in the price block chosen in step (iii). Thus Alice's clicks do not increase.
⊓ ⊔
Lemma 5. The number of clicks a bidder is allocated is non-decreasing in her declared bid.
Proof sketch: For the purposes of this proof, let bidders {1, . . . , n} be such that b 1 ≻ . . . ≻ b n , and consider a new bidder (call her Alice) with declared budget B. We will argue that the number of clicks that Alice receives in non-increasing with her declared bid b. Let p 1 be the price that Alice would pay if b = ∞, and suppose Alice is in the jth price block when she bids ∞. Note that for any bid b ∈ (p 1 , ∞], Alice is still in the jth price block and receives the same number of clicks (B/p 1 ). Let p 2 be the minimum bid required to keep Alice in the jth price block.
We claim that if b ∈ [p 2 , p 1 ], the price will always be exactly b: no allocation is made until Alice is considered in step (ii), and when she's considered, FindPrice-Block returns a price p ≥ p 1 , since the set of bidders considered contains all the bidders who produced price p 1 . Thus Alice is a threshold bidder, and in step (iii) Alice's budget is reduced so that the price is exactly b. When b decreases to p 2 , we transition from Alice being in the jth price block to the j +1st price block. As in Theorem 3, at the point of transition the jth price block will have the same price as the j + 1st price block, and in both scenarios Alice spends exactlyB p2 . Thus her clicks do not change. We can iterate these arguments for the j + 1st price block, and so the theorem is proven. 
